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Abstract 
We propose a mathematical procedure for finding informed traders in ultra-high frequency 
trading. We wrote it as Vector ARMA and found condition of its stationarity. For the price exposure 
complied with ARMA(1,2) we proved that underlying asset price difference can be derived as 
ARMA(1,1) process. For validation of the model, we test an influence of informed traders in 
EUR/USD, GBP/USD, USD/RUB pairs and futures, in gold and futures prices, in Russian Trade 
System share index (RTS) and futures trading. We found some evidence of such influence in gold 
and currency pair USD/RUB pricing, in RTS index in the period from Dec 16 till Dec 20, 2013 and 
from Jan 28 till Jan 30.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Identifying of insider traders, defined here as large institutional investors (such as pension or 
hedge funds, market makers, dealers and etc.), is an actual and complex problem. They play an 
important role in maintaining the operating performance of the stock market by providing it with a 
high liquidity, by keeping up some level of prices and trading volumes of financial instruments and  
by smoothing a significant price volatility. Besides the special functions, they use privileges which 
are not accessible to individual investors and speculators (Scholtus et al. (2014); Lepone and Yang 
(2013); Dey and Radhakrishna (2013)): they may obtain information about important 
macroeconomic indicators faster, they may also possess nonpublic information about firms before it 
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is officially published in the quarterly or annual financial reports. For example, Scholtus et al. 
(2014) determine the statistical significance of return changes and show an increase in trading 
activity before the official announcement time of such important economic indicators as Chicago 
PMI and UMich Sentiment. It appears that subscribers receive information 3 and 5 minutes earlier 
than others. And, at the time of the announcement published data is already included in the price 
and significant spikes disappear.  
We intentionally did not determine the impact of insiders on the trading activity. First, we 
assume that the number of insiders is low in comparison to large traders. Second, their activity is 
regulated, for example, by Securities Exchange Act (USA) or by Federal Law no. 224-FZ (Russia). 
Third, the insider may benefit from the disclosure of private information to informed traders (see, 
e.g., Grégoire and Huang (2012); Liu and Zhang (2011)), because it facilitates the increase of 
market activity and stock prices, therefore profit of the insider increases too. 
The literature on the detection of insider and informed traders is large. Even so, special 
attention is devoted to the classic paper of Kyle (1985). It employs basic ideas and an original two-
period Kyle model for insider trading using a linear price disclosure function and existence of the 
equilibrium strategy with no public disclosure, considering the market efficiency and profit 
maximization by the monopolistic insider. Later, the approach was commonly accepted and 
developed in many works (Grégoire and Huang (2012); Liu and Zhang (2011); Wang et al. (2009); 
Daher et. al. (2012)). So, Grégoire and Huang (2012); Liu and Zhang (2011) developed 
mathematical models of interaction between one insider, N institutional investors, a number of 
individual (“noise”) traders and one market maker. In Daher et. al. (2012) authors implied the 
Cournot competition (duopoly) in the Kyle model and, by analogy with Wang et al. (2009), 
examined the Stackelberg competition where insiders are the owner of the company and top 
manager subordinated to him.  
Ideas of Kyle influenced the papers of Deb et al. (2014); Zhou (2012); Vitale (2012); Piccione 
and Spiegler (2014); Yang and Li (2014)). So, Deb et al. (2014) examines the competition among 
informed traders and a market maker in the presence of a noise trader. The authors establish a three-
period rational expectations equilibrium (REE) model where informed traders receive and verify a 
noisy signal, and trade by their own. 
In Zhou (2012) the original two-period Kyle model is generalized for the case of a single 
insider, who has some confidence degree, multiple market makers and multiple noise traders. 
Authors find the optimal trading strategies for such insider, based on the information available to 
him and his belief level (confident or pessimistic). Using the same initial assumptions Vitale (2012) 
presumes that such insider is risk-averse, implying a multi-security version of Kyle‟s model with 
Markovian linear sequential equilibrium.  
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Lastly, papers of Piccione and Spiegler (2014); Yang and Li (2014)) suggest a trading model 
with investor sentiment that extends the original Kyle model. In this model, there are an informed 
rational investor, who maximizes his expected profits, and uninformed „noise‟ sentiment speculator, 
who trades on sentiment shocks. Authors derive an analytical solution to the sentiment equilibrium 
prices and describe a dynamic price path.  
There exists a significant disadvantage in all the foregoing papers – they employ the linearity 
of the risky asset price exposure, which in our opinion, limits the scope of their applicability. 
The paper of Park and Lee (2010) presents a nonlinear model of the dynamics of risky asset 
returns in the presence of insider trading. The authors disclose the dependence of risky asset returns 
on the amount of insider transactions and denote it in the form of an ARMA(1,1) model. 
Furthermore, they obtain the detection criteria of insider trading which proved to be closely related 
with stability conditions of the ARMA(1,1) process.  
Along with the identification of insiders and informed traders only by changes in underlying 
asset prices there exist methods that involve its derivatives, notably options (Popescu and Kumar 
(2013); Hu (2013); Muravyev et al. (2013)). Thus, Popescu and Kumar (2013) verify the put-call 
parity for American options with two different strikes for different market agents and compute the 
probability of informed trading (PIN). And, Hu (2013) found an order imbalance in trades of the 
underlying asset and its three options, i.e. in-the-money (ITM), at-the-money (ATM) и out-of-the-
money (OTM) options, that enables to compute the probability of informed traders. Muravyev et al. 
(2013) combine those two approaches. 
The possibility of addressing futures prices for detection of informed traders was first noted in 
Yi-Tsung (2013), where it is shown that the enhancement of the trading activity in the futures 
market anticipates an increased activity in the spot-market, but in most cases the direction of trade 
(to sell or to buy) remains unclear, even if using the non-public information. 
The purpose of this study is to develop the methodology for identification of the impact of 
informed traders on the trading activity considered in Park and Lee (2010). Hence, we present a 
Vector ARMA model for tick prices of futures and its underlying asset and estimate limits of its 
instability. Furthermore, we formulate relevant decisive criteria. The computational algorithm is 
applied for the analysis of high frequency data for the period that precedes announcements of 
important macroeconomic information about phasing out the program of "quantitative easing” 
(QE3) and U.S. GDP growth for the third quarter of 2013, as well as in the period following this 
news.  
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we construct a mixed multi-period model of 
informed trading in terms of stock and futures return series and investigate its characteristics. In 
Section 3 we analyze the effectiveness of detection criteria through a simulation and apply it to FX 
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pairs, spot gold prices, developing country share index and their futures in time  of QE3 ending 
announcements. Finally, Section 4 presents our conclusions. 
 
2. Model 
Let‟s assume that number of all players on the stock market, trading an underlying asset and 
its futures contract, are divided into informed traders and ordinary “noise” traders. Let a 
macroeconomic announcement affecting the price, be publicly known at a future time T, while the 
informed trader has obtained the data at time t<T. We assume that he decides to buy (sell) the 
underlying asset or futures in equal installments at regular intervals, i.e. at time t, (t+1), …, T. Then 
the effect of changes in the underlying asset price could be defined as  
ttt uvX  , 
where  2,0~ ut Nu   – addition to the price, offered by uninformed traders, tv  – surcharge to the 
price that an informed trader is willing to pay.  
Let tv  obey the relation 
ttv  , 
where β – coefficient of proportionality, t  – value of trading transaction of informed trader. 
We suppose that t  satisfies AR(1) model, which is explained by the desire of the informed 
trader to hide his activity and, for instance, to reduce his contribution tv  at low levels of market 
activity: 
ttt z 1 ,     (1) 
where   – average value of trading transaction price per time unit,  2,0~ zt Nz   – price noise. 
Let St  be a quote of the underlying asset at time t. Since a trader buys a large quantity of the 
underlying asset, we assume that St will vary proportionally to the change of prices:   
ttt XSS  1 ,     (2) 
where 
  
 1
1,cov


tt
ttt
vXD
vX
– market depth variation coefficient. 
It follows from equation (2) that the coefficient t  defines a price exposure with respect to all 
market participants. Moreover in our case it is easy to verify that 
22
2
uz
z


 , 
If noise processes tt uz ,  are independent of one another.  
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Using an analytical representation of tX  and substituting t  defined by (1), equation (2) can 
be written as an ARMA (1,1) model from Park and Lee (2010): 
11   tttt SS ,    (3) 
where  2,0~  Nt  is a noise process,    
122222222 211

  uz , 
    12 21         122222222222222222 211  uzuzuz ,  
 
T
SST 01

 .  
Representation of equation (2) in the form of (3) allows us to entail the following conditions 
from Park and Lee (2010): 1) if ρ<0, then 0<δ<-ρ; 2) if ρ>0, then -1<δ<-ρ. We could, therefore, 
formulate the following criterion: 
Criterion: coefficients of the AR(1) and MA(1) parts of model (3) (ρ and δ, respectively) must 
have opposite signs. If 0 , then based on the stability conditions,  . If 0 , then  .  
Let TtSt ..,,1,0,  , be a data set that is available for analysis. Let m<T be a time window 
length, which allows us to calculate the initial estimates of coefficients   




 

m
SSm 0
111 1

, 
1

 and 1

 with quotes mSSSS ...,,,, 210  in model (3). Moving the time window to the right per unit 
until we reach time T, by known smss SSS  ...,,, 1  we estimate  s

, s

 and s

,  mTs  ..,,1,0 . 
Furthermore, we use empirical values of the coefficients found to formulate a decision rule. 
Accordingly, we write the criterion: 
Decisive criterion: subject to non-zero price movements 0k

,  mTk  ..,,1,0 , we assume that 
the informed transaction is detected if one of the following inequalities holds: 
а) 
k
k
k
k

<0, 0
k
k

, 
k
k
k
k
 ; б) 
k
k
k
k

<0, 0
k
k

, 
k
k
k
k

. 
Further, let tF  be a futures price of the underlying asset priced at tS . It is well known that 
there exists a relation (Alexander and Barbosa (2008)): 
  tTrSF tt  exp ,      (4) 
where r – risk-free interest rate, T – expiry time for a futures contract, t – current time, one can 
write the analogue of equation (3) for returns 1 tF .  
Now we state our main results of this paper. 
Theorem 1 . Let’s suppose      1exp1 01   tTrSeeA rrt ,   1exp~  tTrtt   
is a Gaussian noise process,     1exp11   tTreeC rrt . Then,  
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1
1
1
2
11
~~




   tt
t
j
jtt
r
tt SCFeAF .    (5) 
The proof of theorem 1 is listed in Appendix A .  
 
Theorem  2 .  System of equalities (3) and (5) can be written in the form of the Vector ARMA 
model: 
   11
1
1
1 ;
~;~
~~~



   tttt
t
j
jttt CXBXAX ,   (6) 
where  111 ;   ttt SFX ,    ;
~
1tAA  – vectors, 












1
2 0~
t
r
C
e
B , 






 0
00~
1tC
C  – square 
matrices 2×2.  
The proof of Theorem 2 is obvious. 
We note that representing the process in the form of (6) allow us to determine the conditions 
of its stationarity (see, e.g., Wei (2006) for getting conditions and estimation of the stationarity of 
Vector ARMA processes). From the results we can formulate Theorem 3: 
Theorem 3. Process 1tX  in equation (6) is stationary, if 1 . 
The proof of theorem 3 is listed in Appendix A .  
Theorem 3 enables us to write the necessary generalized criterion of the presence of informed 
traders when trading futures contracts and the underlying asset on them: 
Generalized criterion: 1) if -1<ρ<0, then 0<δ<-ρ; 2) if 1>ρ>0, then -1<δ<-ρ.  
The decisive criterion will barely change and can be rewritten easily.  
At the end of this section we notice that if unlike equation (1) we choose the price exposure 
process t  as ARMA(1,2), i.e.  
11   tttt zz ,     (7) 
then equation (3) for underlying asset price should be rewritten under the following theorem. 
Theorem 4.  In case an informed trader implements a mixed strategy (2) with 
22
2
4
4
uz
z


  as 
the information exposure strategy in a multi-period model, underlying asset price difference follows 
the ARMA(1,1) process below. 
11   tttt SS ,    (8) 
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where  2,0~  Nt ,   
12222222 1

  z ,  
T
SST 01

 , 
        122222222222 2214121  zuuzuzu .   
The proof is listed in the Appendix A. 
 
3. Numerical simulation results 
3.1. Data 
We use ultra-high frequency tick data for EUR/USD, GBR/USD and USD/RUB currency 
pairs and spot gold prices, their March, 2014 futures, 1 min data for Russian Trade System share 
index (RTS) and its futures (ticker RIH4) in the period Dec 17 – Dec 20, 2013 and Jan 28 – Jan 30, 
2014. The data were obtained from FINAM holding (www.finam.ru) and CME Group. 
The choice of financial instruments for analysis is due to macroeconomic statistics, its 
information is disclosed in certain periods of time: it is news about phasing out the U.S. monetary 
stimulus, i.e. QE3, and final data on U.S. GDP for the III quarter of 2013, and preliminary - for the 
IV quarter of 2013, from which the termination time of QE3 was depended on.  
 
3.2. Results 
While three incentive programs were functioning, the first one was launched in March, 2009, 
the role of regional currencies (Australian and New Zealand dollar, Brazilian and Mexican peso, 
Chinese yuan, South African rand, Russian ruble, Turkish lira and Indonesian rupiah) significantly 
increased (Triennial Central Bank Survey Report (2013)): for example, the percentage share of 
rouble in “net-net” turnover in the FX market increased from 0,9% to 1,6% for last three years. And 
this situation is not unique: the share of RMB increased over the same period from 0.9% to 2.2%, 
the Mexican peso - from 1.3% to 2.5%, the Turkish lira - from 0.7% to 1.3 %. These facts indicate 
that there was a free cash flow from developed countries to developing ones over the past three 
years. On the one hand, it stimulated their economies and strengthened regional currencies up to a 
certain point of time. On the other hand, imbalances increased and overheating of economies 
occurred at the first threat of collapse of the incentive programs, which led to a sharp devaluation of 
the local currency and the stock market crashes. All of these help to identify large informed traders 
and fix their activity, for example, in the Russian or any other emerging markets.  
The possible existence of relationship between FX market and gold prices during the crisis is 
discussed in the paper by Pukthuanthong and Roll (2011), where strong positive correlations 
between gold prices and Dollar, Euro, Yen and Pound were found and investigated.  Therefore, we 
investigate the activity of traders in trading of gold futures and examine the gold spot prices. 
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Let‟s define the impact of informed traders in intraday trading of currency pairs EUR/USD, 
GBR/USD, USD/RUB and March, 2014 futures.  
The results of calculations with the time window length m=1 hour, are presented in Table 1, 
Panel A – C.   
[Table 1 is here] 
 
According to the results of calculations, given in Table 1, Panel A-C we conclude that there is 
no significant impact of informed traders in trading of highly liquid currency pairs EUR/USD and 
GBR/USD, while for emerging market currencies USD/RUB we traced it on January 29, 2014, due 
to the observed capital flight from emerging to developed markets while phasing out QE3. 
Because of the relationship of FX market and gold prices discussed in Pukthuanthong and 
Roll (2011), it is interesting to investigate the activity of traders in the gold trade at the beginning of 
the global structural changes.  
We analyze the tick retail price of gold and futures on it. It is known that these prices are 
closely associated with capital inflows to developing countries and affect their foreign exchange 
rates (Apergis (2014)), inflation and FX reserves. The results of calculations with the width of the 
time window m = 1h present in Tables. 2. The results of calculations with the time window length 
m=1 hour, are presented in Table 2.   
 
[Table 2 is here] 
 
According to the results of calculations, given in Table 2 we found the impact of informed 
traders in gold trading in days following announcements of phasing out the program QE3. It is 
predictable since the termination of QE3 has a direct impact on expectations of large players about 
the reduction of supply of dollar in the world and, as a consequence, the decrease of precious metal 
prices. 
In our opinion, such reason is based on the drop of indices in developing countries. We show 
it on the example of an emerging stock market, such as Russia. 
We analyze 1-minute data of March, 2014 futures on RTS index (ticker RIH4) priced in 
rouble and 1-minute data of RTS index priced in dollar. These index assets have a rouble-dollar 
nature and the quotes depend directly on EUR/USD rate associated with processes of capital flight.  
The results of calculations with the time window length m=1 hour, are presented in Table 3. 
 
[Table 3 is here] 
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Thus, our calculations identify two different stages after the announcement of the termination 
of QE3. At the first stage (Dec 18 - Dec 20, 2013) informed traders showed high activity in gold 
trading and futures on it, but closer to the end of the stage they switched to index assets of emerging 
markets that our calculations revealed. At the second stage (Jan 28 - Jan 30, 2014) operations with 
currencies of developing countries (e.g., RUB) were added to the trading activity that is correlated 
to the capital flight to developed markets. At the same time suspicious transactions with highly 
liquid pairs EUR/USD, GBR/USD were not detected in the FX market, despite the high volatility of 
their prices throughout the first stage. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Our analysis shows that the proposed generalized and decisive criteria allow to identify the 
activity of informed traders in intraday trading in global markets. Further, it is shown that such 
traders while are unable to even in the short term to set their movement trajectory prices on all stock 
markets, i.e. principles of fair and honest trading are fulfilled. Further, we reveal the current 
inability of such traders to determine price trajectories in all stock markets, i.e. principles of fair and 
honest trading are fulfilled. At the same time, informed trading in the emerging market of Russia is 
detected easier while using a wide range of financial instruments. 
APPENDIX A. Proofs. 
To prove Theorem 1, we first state and prove an auxiliary Lemma 1.  
Lemma 1: If Ft holds equality (4), then  
t
tr
tt
S
S
eFF 11

  . 
Proof. By (4),   tTrSF tt  exp ,   1exp11   tTrSF tt . Hence, 
r
t
t
t
t e
S
S
F
F
lnlnln 11   . 
Proof of Theorem 1. According to (3), 11   tttt SS , or, in terms of prices, 
  111 1   ttttt SSS . We apply this expression to the results in the proof of Lemma 
1. Then, 
 
t
ttttr
tt
S
SS
eFF 111
1 


 , or 
  







 
t
t
t
ttr
tt
S
S
S
eFF 111 1 . 
Let‟s use Lemma 1 once again: 
t
r
t
t
r
t
t
t
t
t
Fe
F
F
eF
S
S
S
S 1
1
1
1
1
1 




 











 . So  
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  







 
t
r
t
t
ttr
tt
Fe
F
S
eFF 111 1 ,  
or, by (4),      







 
t
r
t
t
tt
tt
r
Fe
F
tTr
F
FFe 111 1exp , i.e.  
      
r
t
tttt
r
e
F
FtTrFe 111 1exp

  .  
Let‟s form the difference 1 tF  in the left side of the equation, then we subtract and add t
r Fe : 
      
r
t
t
r
ttt
r
e
F
FetTrFe 111 1exp

  .  
We proceed similarly with the last term on the right side of the equation:  
now,  
t
rr
t
r
t FeeFeF

  1 , 
then 
       trtrrtttr FeFeetTrFe   1exp11 .  
Let‟s transform Ft. substituting the price equation in (4) with 
0
1
211 ... SSSSSSSS
t
j
jtttttt  

 , where S0 – known initial price of the 
underlying asset, and dividing both sides of the equation by e
r
, considering notions of the theorem 
we obtain equation (5). 
Proof of  Theorem 3. According to the general theory of stationary of Vector ARMA processes 
(Wei (2006)), 1tX  is stationary if and only if all eigenvalues of B
~
 and C
~
 in (6) lie inside the unit 
circle in the complex plane. Clearly, matrix B
~
 has two real eigenvalues: re 2  and ρ, and matrix C
~
 
– zero eigenvalue of multiplicity 2. Since 12   re  by condition of the theorem, then 1tX  is 
stationary. 
Proof of Theorem 4. After double substitution of equation 1 into equation 2 with different t we 
obtain 
ttttt uzzS   11 ,    (A.1) 
    1111
2
1 11   tttttt uzzzS .  (A.2) 
We modify (A.2) as  
tttttt uuzzSS   111 .    (A.3) 
We denote the autocovariance of some auxiliar expression 
11   tttt SS  
as Vj, so V0 and V1 can be easily computed as follows: 
11 
 
   12220 121

 V ,    (A.4) 
   122220 1

 V .    (A.5) 
If we compute similar autocovariances of (A.3) directly and equate them to (A.4) and (A.5), 
we can find unknown   and 2 . The system of such equations is as written below:  
     2212221222 1121 uz 

 , 
       122212222 111   z .  
So, it is proved that  
        122222222222 2214121  zuuzuzu , 
   12222222 1   z .  
These coefficients, obviously, define our auxiliar expression in the form (8) needed. 
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Table 1  
Impact of informed traders on trading process in the analysis of EUR/USD, GBR/USD, USD/RUB 
and their March, 2014 futures tick prices at different dates 
Panel A. EUR/USD  
Date 
Underlying asset Futures 
Presence of impact 
  

 

 

 
17.12.2013 0,176 0,327 0,168 0,277 declined 
18.12.2013 0,769 0,836 0,309 0,679 declined 
19.12.2013 0,344 0,443 0,869 0,908 declined 
20.12.2013 0,244 0,350 -0,639 -0,667 declined 
28.01.2014 0,008 0,219 0,507 0,559 declined 
29.01.2014 -0,079 0,082 0,058 0,152 declined 
30.01.2014 0,788 0,848 -0,894 -0,866 declined 
Panel B. GBR/USD 
17.12.2013 0,740 0,769 -0,091 -0,196 declined 
18.12.2013 0,034 0,099 0,278 0,374 declined 
19.12.2013 -0,007 0,089 -0,643 -0,689 declined 
20.12.2013 -0,457 -0,403 0,347 0,286 declined 
28.01.2014 0,782 0,808 0,361 0,713 declined 
29.01.2014 0,057 0,206 0,361 0,662 declined 
30.01.2014 0,598 0,656 -0,090 -0,208 declined 
Panel C. USD/RUB 
17.12.2013 -0,120 0,746 -0,112 -0,193 declined 
18.12.2013 0,090 0,700 0,380 0,394 declined 
19.12.2013 -0,020 0,781 -0,503 -0,619 declined 
20.12.2013 -0,065 0.789 0,247 0,295 declined 
28.01.2014 -0,104 0,581 -0,211 -0,312 declined 
29.01.2014 -0,696 0,196 -0,582 0,275 accepted 
30.01.2014 -0,232 0,431 -0,210 0,331 declined 
 
 
Table 2 
Impact of informed traders on trading process in the analysis of tick spot gold prices and  
March, 2014 futures tick prices at different dates 
 
Date Gold Futures Presence of impact 
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  

 

 

 
17.12.2013 -0,115 0,231 -0,055 0,138 declined 
18.12.2013 -0,315 0,166 -0,298 0,061 accepted 
19.12.2013 -0,077 0,289 -0,086 0,233 declined 
20.12.2013 -0,087 0,244 -0,013 0,202 declined 
28.01.2014 -0,034 0,279 0,462 0,782 declined 
29.01.2014 -0,251 0,050 0,334 0,709 accepted 
30.01.2014 0,144 0,299 0,454 0,763 declined 
 
 
Table 3  
Impact of informed traders on trading process in the analysis of 1-minute data of RTS index and 
prices of RIH4 futures at different dates 
 
Date 
RTS Index 
Futures on RTS 
Index Presence of impact 
  

 

 

 
17.12.2013 -0,655 -0,695 0,251 0,352 declined 
18.12.2013 -0,853 -0,756 0,178 0,299 declined 
19.12.2013 -0,633 -0,688 -0,114 -0,039 declined 
20.12.2013 0,808 0,773 -0,146 0,017 accepted 
28.01.2014 0,874 0,845 -0,306 -0,295 declined 
29.01.2014 0,205 0,043 0,769 0,724 declined 
30.01.2014 0,258 0,046 -0,431 -0,439 declined 
 
